Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

The State of Utah v. Phillip Cooper George And William Wade
Thompson : Brief of Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen; Attorney for Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. George, No. 12135 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5038

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plointiff-Be8'p0f'l(/,ent,
vs.
PHILLIP COOPER GEORGE
and WILLIAM WADE
THOMPSON,
Defendanta-Appellants.

Case No.
12185

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from tile J .......t el tlle
District Coart of Welter 0Gllllty, IJtu

Honorable Chari• G. Cew19J'

I

ON B. ROMNEY

'

I

PHIL L. BAJQmf
Attorney for T>etmd.....
Appellailts
410 li:mDire
s.1t Lake
M111

" Attorney General and
Attorney for Plaintiff- Respondent
Capitol Building
- e City, Utah 84114

.I

'

av:

FILED
NOV 1 61970

•

!

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

XATURE OF THE CASE-------------···-----···------------ I
IN LOWER COURT ------------ 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-------------------- 2

I

STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------·········------- 2
ARGUMENT

I

I
I

POINT I -----------·-····-··--·-····------------------···--·----------------3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO
DlSjllSS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
ErIDENCE 'v AS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILTY.
POINT II -------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY IMPROPERLY INSTRl'CTIN G THE JURY ON HOW TO
ErALUATE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

POINT III -------------------------------------------------····-···--·······
13
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTIXG APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A MIS' TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
PROSECUTOR MADE A COMMENT THAT
1

Pa;

11\IPLIED THE FAIL URE OF THE APPELLANTS TO TESTIFY COULD BE
USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM.

POINT IV ---------------------------------------------------------·········r
THE APPELLANTS HA VE BEEN DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOFRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE
THE PROSECUTOR MADE AN ARBITRARY AND INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION WHEN HE CHOSE TO PROSECUTE
APPELLANTS AND TACITLY AGREED
NOT TO PROSECUTE CERTAIN STATE
WITNESSES WHO ADMITTED THAT
THEY HAD COMMITTED OFFENSES IX
CONNECTION WITH THE CHARGE
AGAINST THE APPELLANTS.
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------···-----··-·
AUTHORITIES CITED

Chapman 'V. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967) ......... :-I
Commonwealth v. Fancy, 207 N. E. 2d 276_{19651 ,:

I

Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. "

220 ( 1949) ---·---------·----------------------------------------·--· ; '

F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 ..
( 1920) -------·------------------------------------------------··

'

Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 ( 1948) .......... ..
Griffin 'V. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965) .... 13. :.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 ( 1956) -----·······----· ·
11

Page
l'lliple v. Gillis, 6 Utah 84, 2I Pac. 404 ( I889) ____

8

People v. Scott, IO Utah 2I 7, 27 P. 335 ( I894) .. IO, I2
Hriil1cay Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S .
106 (I 949) ---------------·---·-·---------·---·-----------·------------ I8

St11te v. Anderson, I08 Utah I30, I58 P. 2d I27

( 1945) ------------·--·-------·---·--·······--····---····---------·
IO, I2

State v. Andrews, 165 N. W. 2d 528 (Minn. I969) __ 2I
State v. Brown, I4 Utah 2d 324, 383 P. 2d 930

(1963) ---·-···--·····-····-···--·····--····----············--·---··------I5

State v. Burch, IOO Utah 4I4, 115 P. 2d 911

( 194I) -----------·--··-----···-··-·-···---·---------·--·-·---8, IO, I2

State v. Chynoweth, 4I Utah 354, I26 Pac. 302
(1912) --··--·······----···········---·····--··--·····---··-····-------·-··
4

State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 20I P. I030
(192I) ····--·········-··············---·-·---··--·---·-····--·---IO, I2

State v. Erwin, IOI Utah 365, I20 P. 2d 285
(1941) ----··-···--·····-···--··············-··--········-·····-------4, IO

State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P. 2d 57
(1960) ··-··-··--·----······-···-····----···-······--····-·-----------4, I 0

Stnte v. Laub, I02 Utah 402, I3I P. 2d 805

(1942) -----·---··----··-······----------········-·-····-···------IO, I2

Stotev. Morrell, 39 Utah 498, 118 Pac. 2I5 (I911)

4

State v. Starlight Club, I7 Utah 2d I74, 406 P. 2d
912 ( 1965) ------·----·--·-··---------------···········---······--··--2I
1'oufor v. City of Pine Bluff, 289 S. W. 2d 679
(Ark. 1956 )--··-----------------···---···-·----·-··----------··----2 I
111

W ashin,qton v. United States, 401 F. 2d 915
(D. C. Cir. 1968 )-----------------------------------------··········:·. :
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U. S. 483
1

( 1955) ---------------------------------------------------------········. J• II

CONSTITUTIONS
U. S. Const. amends V and XIV -------------------·-·-· 13. 11

ARTICLES

Developments in the Law - Equal Protection,
82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969) ------------------·······l.

lV

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

PHILLIP COOPER GEORGE
and VVILLIAM WADE
THOMPSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12135

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged jointly in the District
Cnurt of "\Veber County, State of Utah, with having
mmitted the crime of grand larceny by allegedly
l:aying stolen a certain pickup truck and camper from
'ear lot in Ogden, Utah.
,.

1

1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Appellants were found guilty by a jury of ti
crime of grand larceny as charged in the informatii
and were sentenced by the trial court to serve fo
one to ten years in the Utah State Prison.
.
11

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of their convictions a1
sentences.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellants were charged with having stole •
a certain pickup truck and camper from the car lot l
Lyle's Auto Sales in Ogden, Utah, on or about Fd
ruary 1, 1969.
1

Except for the general statement that the campe.
at the car lot was a dark green 1967 Chevrolet tlm·
quarter ton truck, which has never yet been foun<l, the
was no other evidence produced at trial to further J,
scribe the truck. In fact, Witness Arave, when ash
if he had brought with him to trial any docume1r
pertaining to the truck and camper, replied, "I're g
a bill of sale on the camper. I didn't bring nothing
the truck." (Tr. 35, 36.)
l

The camper turned up at the home of fran
Elsburg, who sought and found a buyer for it.
t
people were present at the Elsbury home when:
2

::unper was loaded from the ground, not from the
)tolen truck, onto another truck and paid for with
cash by Witness Mrs. Brimhall to \Vitness
Elsbury, who kept $100.00 and gave Appellant
Thompson $500.00 to be paid to Mr. Dan Richards.
\ppcllant George received no money for himself and
did nothing except help load the camper from the
,,round, not even from the stolen truck, onto another
for it to be delivered to the home of the Brimhalls.
Of all the people present at the home of the
Elsburys at the time of these events, only the appellants
, 11ere charged with any crime. Yet, absolutely no evillence connected the appellants with the theft of the
:ruck, which was never described or found, or with
the theft of the camper. At the very worst, the appelLmts were remotely involved with the sale and loading
"f the camper alone, not with the theft of either the
1ruck or camper.
After many hours of deliberation, the jury returned verdict of guilt against both appellants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

nrn TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANT1\G APPELLANTS' MOTION

TO DISMISS
, IJX 'l'IIE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE
lrAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT VERDICTS OF GUILT.

3

<

At the close of evidence, appellants moved ford:missal on the grounds that the evidence did not est:ii
lish all the elements of larceny and was insuffieit:
to warrant submitting the case to the jury. (Tr. mu

Before the appellants may properly be comidr
of committing larceny, the state must prove: l) that t/,.
appellants took and transported the property, 2) tL
the property belonged to someone else, 3) that tf1 •
appellants possessed the property, 4) that the appt
lants took and transported the property with a fel. i
1
nious intent, and 5) that the appellants had the spec11:c
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the prop
erty. Each element of the offense must be proved ft
' yond a reasonable doubt before the jury may proper!:
convict (State v. Garcia, II Utah 2d 67, 71, 355 P!·
57 ( 1960); State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 400, 120 P
2d 285, 302 ( 1941) ) . If the evidence is insutficie:, I
as to any one of the elements of the offense, the Cji: :
should not go to the jury. See e.g., State v. Momi
39 Utah 498, ll8 Pac. 215 ( 1911) The Utah Supreni
Court reversed the conviction because the evidence 11· '.
insufficient as to two of the elements: l) that ti' :
property belonged to another, and 2) that the defeni:
ant took the property with felonious intent); State·
Chynoweth, 41 Utah 354, 126 Pac, 302 ( 1912) Tf,
evidence was insufficient to show felonious intent.' ·
I

1

In the instant case there is no evidence to establi·
the elements of taking, transporting, posession or ft;
nious intent. It can be determined from the eritler:
that on or about February l, 1969, a truck and a cerL
4

were taken from Lyle's Auto Sales. Shortly
,hereafter, the camper turned up at the residence of
!'rank :Elsbury. The record does not disclose the idenitlr of or what happened to the truck. The camper
rt;llaiue<l on El bury' s property for about a week, during
11 hieh time he negotiated the sale of it to E. D. Brimhall, an old friend of his. After Brimhall purchased
:hnamper, a police officer was able to have it identified
,\ the une stolen from Lyle's. The testimony only
,1nmccted the appellants to three events surrounding
sale, not the theft, of the camper, not the truck.
l
Frank Elsbury testified that the appellant, Phill;p George, was in the company of two other men at
:he time Elsbury first observed the camper on his
1miperty. The appellant, a personal friend of Elsbury,
had driven to the Elsburys' in his own automobile and
helping Elsbury and two other men push a truck
"1thout a camper out of the mud. It is important to
:1o!e that Elsbury, who admitted to receiving and sellng the stolen camper and who was never prosecuted
Jecause he "turned state's evidence," could not connect
appellant to the truck or camper other than by his
physical presence on the same property where the
amper was stored and sold:

,:tinpt'f

1

1

Now, .Mr. Elsbury, you have no knowledge
yourself from your own powers of perception,
ability to observe, see, and what not, that this
defendant, lV[r. George, stole any truck or
any camper; do you?

A. Nope.
5

Q. Nor do you have any knowledge that defep !
and George had in his possession any
or any truck; do you?
·

1

1

A. No.

Q. Nor do you have any knowledge as to hm
that camper got to your property; do you'.
A. Yes, I know how it was got there. Yes.

Q. You weren't there when it was delivereJ
were you?
A. No, but I seen the truck stuck right to tf,
side of it.
Q. All right. But you didn't see the camper l':
the truck ; did you?

A. No.
Q. And you saw someone else inside that lrur·
while it was stuck?

A. Yes.
Q. While Mr. George, and Thompson for tbs'.
matter, were helping you on the outside!
push it out of the stuck position?

A. Uh, huh.
Q. In fact, Mr. George had his own car at youproperty; didn't he?
A. Uh, huh.
(Tr. 162-163)
Appellant George was also present at Elsbury·
home when Mrs. Brimhall came to purchase the campr:
While money changed hands between .Mrs. Brimh3:
and Elsbury, and between Elsbury and appell3'

6

1

Thompson, both Elsbury (Tr. 163-164) and his wife
I Tr. rnz) testified that the Appellant George received
nu money from the transaction. Again it is only the
presence of Appellant George that connects him to the
case. Finally, after the police had recovered the camper,
)lr. Brimhall contacted the appellants regarding the
return of his money. There was some testimony that
the appellants had told Brimhall that his money would
be returned.
With the possible exception of the evidence of
the appellants' conversations with Brimhall regarding
the return of Brimhall's money, which was after the
fact and ________ ---· ---- .... , the entire evidence against the
appellants is circumstantial; and even this evidence
is arguably circumstantial because Brimhall did not
testify that the appellants had ever stated that they
were parties to the theft or the sale or that they perirmally had any of Brimhall's money. But whether
this evidence is circumstantial or not, the only evidence presented in this case that involves the appellants is that regarding the sale, not the theft of stolen
property. There was absolutely no attempt to prove
that the appellants ever took this property or that they
mr possessed it. While by statute possession may be
deemed enough for a prima facie case of larceny, there
:\absolutely no evidence that the truck or camper was
crer possessed by the appellants. There is no testimony
1Jdicating any exercise of exclusive control by the appellants. To inf er that because they were present when
1
sale was made that they had something to do with
7

the sale, and then to infer theft from that, is to Iltl,
an inference based on an inference based on anotr::
inference. And a jury should not be allowed to empJ,
such speculative reasoning. State v. Burch, 100 L'L.
414, 115 P. 2d 911 ( 1941). In addition. Elsburv t1
.''·
most likely of the state's witnesses to know if the ,
1
pellants ever possessed the property, specifically lbt
fied that he had no knowledge of the appellants m
possessing the camper or the truck. Of course, if t1
appellants never possessed the property, it is imp1'!
sible for them to have fulfilled the necessary
of taking and transporting. People v. Gillis, 6 l'tJ:
84, 21 Pac. 404 ( 1889). And, therefore, they cam11
be properly guilty of larcency.
This case is remarkably similar to the .Massaci:L
setts case of Commonwealth v. Fancy, 207 U. E.
( 1965) . In that case the appellant was convicted ,
the larceny of 835 cases of liquor and appealed tk
he should have been granted a directed verdict on tl,
grounds of insufficient evidence. The evidence showt
that a trailer containing the liquor was seen outsic·
a safe on the night it was stolen and that the defendar
was with several other men inside the cafe. The
fendant left with the others and shortly
trailer was moved. About three days later police otl
cers went to an apartment and found the appellant ar
two other men. 'Vhen questioned, the appellant ga::
a false name. A search of the apartment revealed c35c
and bottles of the stolen liquor. In holding that tn

8

i<lcnce was insufficient to support the conviction, the
luurt stated:

c\

\Ve are a ware of the presumption against a defendant who, without a satisfactory explanation,
has in his possession recently stolen goods.
cited} But it was never established that Fancv
erer had any of the Cuty Sark whisky in his
possession. The evidence shows only that he was
a ,·isitor at an apartment where the liquor was
found. 'Ve are also mindful that "[i]n order to
convict on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary to show that it was not in the power of any
other person than the defendants to commit the
erime." [Cases cited} It is, however, equally well
established "if, upon all the evidence, the question of the guilt of the defendant is left to conjecture or surmise and has no solid foundation
in established facts, a verdict of guilty cannot
stand. Cases [cited} When the evidence tends
equally to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have
been established by legitimate proof. [Cases
eited} In the case at bar, it can readly be inferred
that Fancy associated with persons who committed the larcency, but this does not justify the
inference that he participated in the crime. A
contrary holding would be tantamount to introducing into our law a doctrine of guilt by association, a policy which we decline to adopt. 207
N. E. 2d at 280.
The evidence against the instant appellants does
not eyen establish as much as the evidence against
Fancr. Here it only logically allows the inference that
'.lil' appellant associated with persons who participated
a sale, not the theft, of stolen property. There is no
'

1

9

proof as to any other element and, because of this ..
was error not to grant appellants' motion to dism[).
POINT II
THE COURT COM.MITTED PREJUDICLi.i
ERROR BY IMPROPERLY INSTRUC'l'IXL,
THE JURY ON HO\V TO EVALUATE CIR
CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
In State v. Garcia, II Utah 2d 67, 71, 355 P. zu
57 ( I960), the Utah Supreme Court expressed the ruL
that governs the sufficiency and consideration of CH·
cumstantial evidence.

It is universally recognized that there is no jur.
question without substantial evidence
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doul
This requires evidence from which the jury coui·
reasonably find defendant guilty of all maim
issues of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. In :1;
plying this rule, usually with reference tu t1,
jury instructions, we have held that where t! ..
only proof of material fact or one which is
necessary element of defendant's guilt consb:
of circumstantial evidence, such circumstarnt·
must reasonably preclude every reasonable n··
pothesis of defendant's innocence. An instrud1
to this effect in an appropriate situation wr:ui
be proper but this requires care to use
which the jury would understand and ' .h11
would not merely lend to their confusion. [C1tir':
State v. Anderson, I08 Utah I30, 158 P. 2d
(I945); State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131.
2d 805 (1942); State v. Burch, 100
II5 P. 2d 9II (1941); State v. Erwin, 101 lt'
1;

11

10

:

1

365, 120 P. 2d 285 ( 1941) ; State v. Crawford,
59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 ( 1921) ; People v. Scott,
IO Utah 217, 37 P. 335 (1894).) (Emphasis

added.)

The vast majority, if not all, of the evidence against
the appellants was circumstantial, and a proper circumstantial evidence instruction was essential to a fair trial.
The appellants sought to have the trial court give the
reasonable hypothesis instruction normally given when,
.is here (see Point I), the only evidence supporting
certain elements or material facts of the crime is circumstantial.
Mr. Hansen: We will also except to the court'..s
failure to give our instruction on the reasonable
hypothesis given in chambers:
"If you can explain the evidence on two or
more theories, each of which is reasonable, with
one theory being reasonable to convict the defendants and also one theory being reasonable
to acquit the defendants, it is not your duty to
determine what is more reasonable. Instead, it
is your duty to find the defendants not guilty."
And the supposition on circumstantial evidence, though it ref erred to reasonable hypothesis theory, as such, was not in the proper wording
to include the two hypotheses we requested. (Tr.
174)

The trial court chose, however, to instruct the jury
3s follows:
"Circumstantial evidence" is competent evidence
to be considered by you, but in considering it
you must be guided by the following principles
of law:

11

If
believe
a
doubt th,,
the circumstantial evidence 1s true, then it is Yo
duty to determine whether that evidence is ·cour I
sis tent 'vi th the guilt of the defendants and /1"11
consistent with his [sic) innocence.
'
/
To convict the defendants on circumstantia,
evidence all the facts and circumstances
1i.'
consistent with each othe.r,
with the gud;
of the defendants, and
with a11y
reasonable theory of defendants mnocence.

J

.
!'

The reasonable hypothesis instruction
I
by the appellants is clearly the instruction referred (,, ,
in Garcia when the Utah Supreme Court
lower courts to exercise ''care to use language wh1c:
the jury would understand and which would not merei;
lend to their confusion". See the following pages ol tnr
cases cited in the Garcia quote, supra: State v. Andc•
son, 108 Utah 130, 158 P. 2d 127, 130 ( 1945); Stat.
v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805, 807-808 (194t'.
1
State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911,
( 1941) ; St.ate v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1031:.
1033 (1921); People v. Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 P. .J,j;:
(1894).

1

1

Merely to instruct the jury that in order to conrir:
the circumstantial evidence must be consistent with inno· '
cence does not impress upon the jurors the fact thr ! I
they must be able to preclude every reasonable hypotk
SIS.

The problem develops in the focus of the instru'
tion. By focusing on consistencies rather than hypotfi,

I

1

12
I'

,,,, the court encourages the jurors to form the hypo:Jie>is first and then to examine the circumstantial eviilcnce. Evidence under one hypothesis may be consistent
11 ith innocence; while under a different hypothesis, one
lould easily arrive at the opposite conclusion. \Vhe·n
11resented
with circumstantial evidence our judicial
l
iistem demands that a juror look at the evidence first
:;.nd then determine if he can preclude by this evidence
rrery reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The judge
tailed to so instruct the jury and thereby prejudiced
the case against the appellants.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
JPPELLANTS' MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL
OX THE GROUNDS THAT THE PROSECUTOR MADE A COMMENT THAT IMPLIED
THE :FAILURE OF THE APPELLANTS TO
TESTIFY COULD BE USED AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST THEM.
Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), held
that the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by
>he Fourteenth Amendment, "forbids either comment
ov the prosecutoin on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."
'.8U U. S. at 615.

While the transcript in this case does not contain

the finual arguments of counsel, it does report part of

13

the district attorney's comments that led to the appli·
lants' motion for a mistrial.
Mr. Stratford: ... I get the impression tr1
the only person, the only complaint, here toJ •1
is someo?e has
against
def endan; ;
and thats unconstitutional. Thats unAmerieai
If you would, that's improper. If a man is u.:
willing to stand up and testify as to what I:
knows, where then is the union?
1

Mr. Hansen: I beg your pardon, Your Honn:
We'll move for a mistrial as an inference th:1
these people not taking the standStratford: I have not said one thing abuu
these people. I'veThe Court: Well, I'll deny the motion.
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (19tii.
the United States Supreme Court delineated a rule f,:
determining when such a comment by a prosecutor \\·0111.
be reversible error. In that case the court held that r
such a s tatement coudl not be proven beyond a reas1 11,
able doubt to have had no effect on the jury's decisiur
then the case must be reversed.
[W)e hold . . . that before a federal constit1
tional error can be held harmless, the court mu·
be able to declare a belief that it was
beyond a reasonable doubt. 'Vhile appell::.
courts do not ordinarily have the original
of applying such a test, it is a familiar st.11ndar:
to all the courts, and we believe its adopt10n 11 '
provide a· more workable standard ...
Under the circumstances, it is completely
possible for us to say that the State has denw:

14

1

strated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to the petitioners'
convictions. 386 U. S. at 24, 26.
'fhe Utah Supreme Court decided a case closely
analogous to the instant one in State v. Brown, 14 Utah
338 P. 2d 930 (1963). In that case the defendant claimed that at the time the crime was committed
he was at home with his wife. His wife chose to exercise
her constitutional right not to testify, and the district
attorney made a short comment to the effect that the
defendan's wife was the one person who could confirm
the alibi, and she did not testify. The court stated:
The district attorney's comment to the jury, in
substance, that the defendant's wife, the one
person who could have testified that defendant
was home at the time the assault occurred, did
not testify, was prejudicial error. The defendant
objected to the comment on the ground that the
wife has a privilege not to testify against her
husband.
If such comment is permissible, the privilege is
largely destroyed. We conclude that this
ment destroyed tJie privilege to not testify and
was prejudicial. 14 Utah 2d at 327, 328.

Although the Brown case was decided before
Chapman, the result of Brown indicates that the Utah
Court looked unfavorably on such comments
h)· the prosecutor long before the strict test of Chapman
"'>as enunciated. If the prosecutor's passing remark on
:he failure of the defendant's wife to testify could not
':P deemed harmless, then surely a statement that im-

15

plies guilt because the appellants did not testify is prtp:
dicial. It is error for the jury to make adverse inferell,ll
from the appellants' choice not to testify. It is ab.
error when the prosecutor or the court does anything 1,
show official approval of these prejudicial inferenl't,
Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 614 (1965),

Applying the Chapman test to the instant case.,!
is apparent that the state must convince this court beyo!l
a reasonable doubt that the comments of the prosecutur
did not contribute to the appellants' convictions. Even
if this comment was not intended to reflect upon ti1,
appellants' failure to testify (as the prosecutor wuuk
claim), it is clear that it could have no other eff ed 111.
the jury. This statement drew the jury's attention t
the fact that the appellants had not testified and clear:
demonstrated to the jurors that the prosecutor thougL
this action reprehensible. This was an otf icial sancl11 1
of adverse conclusions drawn from the appellants' chott
not to testify and, as such, violated the :Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments of the United States Constit11tiu1.
If the court finds this statement harmless, it w::.
make the issue of commenting on failure to testify tur
on how subtle and clever the prosecutor is at rnakin.
such statements. The evidence against the appellan·
in this case was very meager (see Point I), and it
impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt tl:,
this comment did not contribute to their conviction

16
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POINT IV

APPELLANTS HA VE BEEN DENIED
EQCAL PROTECTION OF THE LA'VIN VI OU. TI ON OF THE FOURTEENTH Al\-IEND){EN'f TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTIiTTION .BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR
)!:\DE AN ARBITRARY AND INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION "\VHEN HE CHOSE TO
PROSECUTE APPELLANTS AND TACITLY
.\GREED NOT TO PROSECUTE CERTAIN
ffATE 'VITNESSES WHO ADMITTED
THAT THEY HAD
OFFENSES
IX CONNECTION WITH THE CHARGE
.\GAINST THE APPELLANTS.
The very essence of the equal protection clause is
'.hat "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
,Jike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S.
ll2, n.5 ( 1920) . That this concept is applicable to crimnal proceedings is demonstrable both in logic and precelent. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 17-18 (1956),
:he United States Supreme Court stated:
In this tradition, our own constitution guaranties of due process and equal protection both
cal for procedures in criminal trials which allow
no indivious discriminations between persons and
different groups of persons.

*

*

*

Consequently at all stages of the proceedings
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
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To determine if any arbitrary or invidious disl'r Ut.
ination has been made during any stages of criminal pr,
ceedings against appellant, it is of primary importanl I
to first consider the amount of discretion allowed slJ!
officials in these matters. It has long been recognizt
that practically every action taken by the state benef::
one group of people more than another; and, therelurr
the mere fact that action taken by state officials I
criminates" does not, by itself, create a denial of
protection. However, at some point a choice made bn,
officer of the state treats two similarly situated
I
so differently that it denies equal protection of the b11 I
Traditionally, the courts have looked to the nature 1'.
the infringement on the individual to determine precise!
where to draw that point. For example, where the di'·
crimination only injures the individual's pocket bop\
the courts have been quick to uphold the state action:: ,
it can demonstrate any rational reason for the discrlm
nation. See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 311
U. S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security
Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agenc,11:
New York, 336 U. S. 106 ( 1949) ;
v. Clean
335 U. S. 464 ( 1948) . On the other hand, if a gran:
type of injury to the individual is caused by the discrin>
ination, the courts demand much more justification 1·
the state's action. This latter type case is usually refem:
to as one involving a fundamental individual interF
"Interests which have been identified as fundament
and therefore deserving of special treatment under ti I
equal protection clause include voting, procreat I
11

I
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I

ri,ifits with respect to criminal procedure, and, to a lesser
Jegree, education." Developments in the Law--Equal
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1127-28 ( 1969) .

.Emphasis added.) When a man's liberty is at issue because of some state decision that affects him differently
than another similiarly circumstanced individual, the
1tate must have some compelling reason that doesn't
uffend fundamental fairness in order to justify its action.

I

In the instant case, the witnesses E. D. Brimhall,
Jo Ann Brimhall, Nita Ann Elsbury and Frank Elsoury all made statements in the course of their testimony
that demonstrated adequate probable cause for their
arrest in connection with this case, yet no action has ever
Deen taken against any of them, and no judicial immunitywas ever sought or granted. The testimony of Frank
Elsbury is most enlightening. This witness testified that
he knowingly possessed a stolen camper for about one
week, during which time he sought and found a buyer
!or it, and that he received $100 "commission" for his
efforts. Tr. 139-164. He was never charged as a defendant or granted immunity from prosecution by courts.
Tr. 139. Rather, the police and the district attorney's
office made an under-the-table agreement with this witness that if he testified against the appellants, they
would bring no action against him.

Mr. Hansen: Did you know that what you admitted to by your testimony today that you had
committed a crime, a felony, calling for five years
imprisonment?
19

"'I
I

.Mr. Elsbury: No.
Mr. llansen: Did you know that it was ar
type of an offense, receiving stolen propertr··

Mr. Elsbury: Yes..

' .

I

.

Mr. Hansen: And isn tit a fact that you
I
that when you were interrogated by Ott'itf·.
Weston?
.,

I

.Mr. Elsbury: Yes.

Mr. Hansen: And that he informed you tl!J I
if you gave evidence against these defendant, I
that they would go easy on you?
j
Mr. Elsbury: It's true.

I

·

(Tr. 160-161

It is important to note what is not present in tLr·
case. First, this is not the case of a judge granting \ill
munity to one co-defendant. While at some point ern
the judicial granting of immunity could be a denial,, 1
equal protection, the use of this procedure makes
1
crimination much less suspect for the reasons supporti11;
the state's choice would have to be made evident totnr
court. Second, this is not a case where a co-defendanL·
charged with a lesser crime because the state doesn'tha1
as much evidence against him. Here the witness admittr.
in open court to every element of the crime of
•I
stolen property and this possession creates a presumr· '!
tion that he committed the larceny charged. Finally. tk Jt
is not a case where other offenders aren't known, and .rt
is
claiming that he is
p:oseculr:I : 1
for domg somethmg that other do all the tune
3
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i

ngprosecuted. State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174,
iotiP. 2d 912 (1965).

Here we have a police officer and the district attor:icr making clandestine agreements not to proceed
1.
several people that will even testify to their own
,ruilt, and then aribtrarily selecting other suspects infar less in the same set of circumstances to be the
\
,,hject o.f their
Of course.' a prosecutor's dis1 aetion is necessarily broad, and he is allowed some sej Jectirity in the enforcement of criminal cases, but this
j )dectivity must be very rationally imposed, because ar! oitrary and invidious discrimination is an abuse of disrretion and a denial of equal protection of the law. Tay/1irv. City of Pine Bluff, 289 S. W. 2d 679 (Ark. 1956);
Washington v. United States, 401 F. 2d 915 (D. C. Cir.
1968); State v. Andrews, 165 N. W. 2d 528 (Minn.
1969). Even with their own testimony, guilt of the state's
witnesses who benefitted from the tacit agreement with
the district attorney is much more evident than the guilt
if appellants. The district attorney had sufficient evilence of the guilt of several people who he chose to release, and still has insufficient evidence against the indi·iduals he chose to prosecute This kind of selectivity is
iogically unsupportable and impossible to excuse as anyili.ing but an arbitrary and invidious discrimination
igainst the appellants. The four state witnesses enumerited above were situated in precisely the same yet more
;uilty position as the appellants before any charges were
'.irought in this case. The mandate of equal protection is
:hat "all persons similiary circumstanced shall be treated

!

I
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alike." This is not the case here, and the appellants ha"
been denied this constitutional right.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully contenii
ed that the judgment against appellant should be re
versed.
Respectf uly submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendants-Appellan'.·
410 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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